Abstract. Quantum Key Distribution (QKD) protocols make it possible for two quantum parties to generate a secret shared key. Semi-quantum Key Distribution (SQKD) protocols, such as "QKD with classical Bob" and "QKD with classical Alice" (that have both been proven robust), achieve this goal even if one of the parties is classical. However, the currently existing SQKD protocols are not experimentally feasible with the current technology. Here we suggest a new protocol ("Classical Alice with a controllable mirror") that can be experimentally implemented with the current technology, and prove it to be robust. 
Introduction
Quantum Key Distribution (QKD) makes it possible for two legitimate parties, Alice and Bob, to generate an information-theoretically secure key [1] , that is secure against any possible attack allowed by the laws of quantum physics. Alice and Bob use an insecure quantum channel and an authenticated classical channel. The adversary Eve may interfere with the quantum channel and is limited only by the laws of nature; she may not, however, modify the data sent in the authenticated classical channel (she can only listen to it).
Semi-quantum Key Distribution (SQKD) protocols limit one of the parties to be classical, yet giving a secure key [4] . The first SQKD protocol was "QKD with classical Bob" [4] ; later, the "QKD with classical Alice" [22, 8] protocol was suggested, as well as various other SQKD protocols (see for example [12, 19, 21] ). Most of the SQKD protocols have been proven "robust": namely [4] , any successful attack by an adversary necessarily induces some noise that the legitimate parties may notice (see also the formal definition in Sect. 2.3). A few of them have also been proven secure [11] .
However, to the best of our knowledge, all the currently existing SQKD protocols cannot be experimentally constructed in a secure way by using the current technology, as explained in Sect. 1.3 . In other words, despite the fact that SQKD protocols should have been easier to implement than QKD protocols (because only one party requires quantum abilities), it turns out that some of the "classical" operations are very hard to implement in a secure way.
We present a new Semi-quantum Key Distribution protocol that can be experimentally constructed by using a "controllable mirror". It is based on "QKD with classical Alice" [22, 8] , but it is more complicated, because it allows Alice to choose one of four operations (instead of two). We prove this protocol to be robust.
Quantum Key Distribution Protocols
QKD protocols achieve the classically-impossible goal of distributing a secret key to two parties (Alice and Bob), in a way that is secure against all the possible attacks. Moreover, the key shared by Alice and Bob remains secret even if weaknesses in the devices (currently unknown to anyone, including the adversary) are discovered in the future: namely, for the adversary Eve to find the key, she must attack when Alice and Bob apply the protocol, and not later (while for encryption methods such as RSA, Eve may keep the ciphertext until she is able to find the private key, e.g., by factorizing a large number).
The first QKD protocol was BB84 [1] : [17, 18] The notion of "(composable) full security" of a protocol (informally) means that, except with an exponentially-small probability ε, one of the two following events happens: the protocol is aborted, or the secret key generated by the protocol is the same as a perfect key that is uniformly distributed, is the same for both parties, and is independent of the adversary's information [17, 16] (see earlier definitions of "full security", that were not composable, in [14, 2, 18] ).
Protocol 1 (BB84
Many QKD protocols have been proven fully (and unconditionally) secure in the theoretical sense [17, 16] .
However, practical implementations deviate from the theoretical descriptions, and may thus be insecure. Two important attacks that take advantage of this fact are the "Photon Number Splitting" attack [10, 9] and the "Bright Illumination" attack [13] . The "Photon Number Splitting" attack takes advantage of the fact that Alice cannot generate only one-photon pulses, but sometimes generates pulses of two (or more) photons: Eve can, under certain conditions, get full information on the secret key without inducing errors. The "Bright Illumination" attack uses a weakness of Bob's detectors, existing in some practical implementations, to get full information on the secret key without inducing errors.
Other QKD protocols, either similar to BB84 or ones that use different approaches, have also been suggested, and in some cases have also been proven fully secure.
Existing Semi-quantum Key Distribution Protocols
The notion of a "Semi-quantum Key Distribution" (SQKD) protocol, in which one of the parties uses only classical operations, was introduced in [4, 5] .
For the purpose of the definition of SQKD protocols, the term "classical operations" refers to the following operations [3] :
1. Measuring a state in the computational basis {|0 , |1 }. 2. Generating a state in the computational basis {|0 , |1 } and sending it to the other party. 3. Reordering quantum states, without measurement. (This operation is not used in this paper, but is useful for randomization-based protocols, such as the protocols described in [5, 3] .) 4. Moving or reflecting a quantum system or subsystem, without changing it. 5. Choosing a random bit. 6. All the regular operations on the classical channel, classical computation, etc.
The operations are "classical" in the sense that they only treat the computational basis {|0 , |1 } (or do nothing). If both Alice and Bob are classical in that sense, and the only interaction is between them, then the protocol is classical, and thus secure key distribution is impossible; however, if one party is classical and the other is quantum, the key distribution protocol may be secure. This protocol was proved to be robust in [4] , and was later proved to be secure [11] .
Quantum
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Alice. An extension to "QKD with classical Bob", in which the originator always sends the same state |+ , was suggested in [22] .
Following [8] , we prefer to call the originator in [22] Bob (and not Alice), and to call the classical party Alice. Thus, we call the SQKD protocol of [22] "QKD with classical Alice". Note that a different protocol (also named "Classical Alice") was suggested in [12], independently of [22] .
Definition 4 (Classical Operations in "QKD with Classical Alice").
As proven in [8] , "QKD with classical Alice" [22] is completely robust against eavesdropping. The proof of robustness was extended in [7] to include photonic implementations and multi-photon pulses.
The Experimental Infeasibility of the SIFT Operation in SQKD Protocols
In many SQKD protocols (such as "QKD with classical Bob" and "QKD with classical Alice" described above), it is assumed that the classical party can either do nothing (the CTRL operation) or measure in the computational basis {|0 , |1 } and then resend (the SIFT operation). In practical (photonic) implementations, and especially if limited to the existing technology, it is quite impossible for the classical party to do that, and the photon generated by him or her during the SIFT operation will probably be at a different timing or frequency, thus leaking information to the eavesdropper; see comment on [4] and the reply [20, 6] .
For example, let us look at the "QKD with classical Alice" protocol, and assume that the two classical states, |0 and |1 , describe two pulses (in two distinct time-bins) on the same arm, such that the photon can either be in one pulse, in the other, or in a superposition (that is a non-classical state).
Given that implementation, it is indeed very difficult for Alice to regenerate the SIFT photons at the right timing. Furthermore, in [20] it is shown that even if Alice could have the machinery to SIFT with perfect timing, Eve can make use of the fact that Alice does not detect the state with perfect qubit-detectors: Eve can modify the frequency of the photon generated by Bob. Then, if Alice SIFTs, she generates a photon in the original frequency, while if she performs the CTRL operation, the reflected photon is in the frequency modified by Eve. Then, by measuring the frequency, Eve can tell whether Alice used the SIFT or the CTRL operation; if Eve finds out that Alice used CTRL, she shifts the frequency back to the original frequency, while if she finds out that Alice used SIFT, she can copy the bit sent by Alice in the computational basis. This "tagging" attack makes it possible for Eve to get full information on the key without inducing noise.
Our Contribution
We suggest a new SQKD protocol, similar to "QKD with classical Alice", that is experimentally feasible: in the original protocol of "QKD with classical Alice", Alice could choose only between two operations (CTRL and SIFT); in our new protocol, Alice may choose between four operations (CTRL, SIFT-1, SIFT-0, and SIFT-ALL), some of them (SIFT-1 and SIFT-0) corresponding to possible reflections of pulses by using a controllable mirror, rather than reflecting a qubit as a whole (CTRL).
We can describe the new protocol in the terms of photon pulses that correspond to distinct time-bins: the state |0 corresponds to one photon in the first time-bin; the state |1 corresponds to one photon in the second time-bin; and the states |+ correspond to superpositions of pulses in the two time-bins. Therefore, |0 and |1 can be seen as classical states, while |+ and |− are strictly quantum states. In this case, the CTRL operation corresponds to operating the mirror on both pulses (reflecting both pulses back to the originator, Bob); the SIFT-1 (SIFT-0) operation corresponds to operating the mirror only on the |0 (|1 ) pulse, while measuring the other pulse; and the SIFT-ALL operation corresponds to measuring all the pulses, without reflecting any of them.
This protocol is experimentally feasible and is safe against the attack described in [20] . Moreover, we prove this protocol to be completely robust against an attacker Eve that is allowed to do anything allowed by the laws of quantum physics, including the possibility of sending multi-photon pulses (namely, assuming that Eve may use any quantum state consisting of the two modes (i.e., two qubit-states) |0 and |1 ).
Preliminaries
The Notations of Quantum Information
In quantum information, information is represented by a quantum state. A quantum pure state is denoted by |ψ , and is a normalized vector in a Hilbert space. The qubit Hilbert space is H 2 = Span{|0 , |1 }, with |0 and |1 being two orthonormal vectors; two other important states in H 2 are |+ |0 +|1 √ 2 and |− |0 −|1 √ 2 . A quantum mixed state is a probability distribution of several pure states, and is represented by a density matrix: ρ = ∑ j p j |ψ j ψ j |, where p j is the probability that the system is in the pure state |ψ j (this definition should not be confused with the probabilities of measurement results). For example, if the mixed state of a system is ρ 1 = 1 3 |0 0| + 2 3 |+ +|, this means that the system is in the |0 state with probability 1 3 and in the |+ state with probability The most general operations allowed by quantum physics for the Hilbert space H are: performing any unitary transformation U : H → H ; adding an ancillary state inside another Hilbert space; measuring a state with respect to some orthonormal basis; and tracing out a quantum system (namely, ignoring and forgetting a quantum system).
See [15] for more background about quantum information.
The Fock Space Notations
The Fock space notations, that serve as an extension of the qubit states, are as follows: the Fock basis vector |0, 1 stands for a single photon in a qubit-state |0 , and the Fock basis vector |1, 0 stands for a single photon in a qubit-state |1 . Naturally, the Hadamard basis qubit-states are given by the superpositions of those Fock states, so that |0,1 ± |1,0 √ 2 stand for a single photon in a qubit-state |± . The general state of this photonic qubit can then be written as α |0, 1 + β |1, 0 , with |α| 2 + |β | 2 = 1. Qubits are embedded in the 2-mode Fock space
where m 1 and m 0 are non-negative integers. The state |m 1 , m 0 represents m 1 indistinguishable photons in the qubit-state |1 and m 0 indistinguishable photons in the qubitstate |0 . More formally, the linear embedding σ : H 2 → F of the qubits in the Fock space is defined by σ |0 = |0, 1 and σ |1 = |1, 0 , and consequently
In particular, the state |0, 0 ∈ F is used for describing absence of photons (the "vacuum state").
Robustness and Security of QKD Protocols
A QKD (or SQKD) protocol is operated by two legitimate parties, normally called Alice and Bob, that try to generate a secret key shared by them. The adversary (Eve) is computationally and technologically unlimited and can do anything allowed by the laws of nature. Following [4] , the robustness of QKD and SQKD protocols is defined as follows:
Definition 6 (Robustness of a QKD Protocol). -A QKD or SQKD protocol is completely robust if, assuming that the parties' probability of finding any error in the bits tested by the protocol equals to zero, Eve cannot obtain any information on the raw key (namely, on the bit string held by Alice and Bob before the error correction and the privacy amplification steps, that give the final key). -A QKD or SQKD protocol is completely nonrobust if, assuming that the parties' probability of finding any error in the bits tested by the protocol equals to zero, Eve can still get full information on the raw key. -A QKD or SQKD protocol is partly robust if, assuming that the parties' probability of finding any error in the bits tested by the protocol equals to zero, Eve can acquire some limited information on the raw key.
In contrast, a "security" of a QKD protocol (informally) means that, except with an exponentially-small probability ε, the protocol either aborts or generates a secret key that is the same as a perfect key: namely, it is uniformly distributed, is the same for Alice and Bob, and is independent of Eve's information [17, 16] .
As said in [4] , a completely nonrobust protocol is automatically insecure, because Eve may steal the whole raw key, while Alice and Bob cannot notice that and will not abort the protocol. However, a completely robust protocol is not necessarily secure. 
After each of those operations, Alice measures her probe (the A state) in the computational basis and sends to Bob the B state.
In the protocol, Alice's actions are described as attaching a probe in Fock space F , applying a swap transformation, and performing a measurement in the computational basis. This description is meant to match the general framework of measurements in quantum information, and it corresponds to the operation performed by Alice: this is a good description of the usage of a mirror (with |0 and |1 being two photon pulses), such that Alice can decide whether the mirror reflects both pulses (CTRL), just the first pulse (SIFT-1), just the second pulse (SIFT-0), or none of the pulses (SIFT-ALL).
A Limitation of the Measurement Devices. In the current reliable implementations of QKD that use the current technology, Alice and Bob are limited in the sense that they cannot count the number of photons in each qubit-state (e.g., count how many photons they detect in the qubit-state |0 and how many photons they detect in the qubit-state |1 ), but can only check whether they get any photon in the qubit-state |0 or not, and also check whether they get any photon in the qubit-state |1 or not. For our protocol (and its robustness analysis) to be practical, we assume that Alice and Bob are indeed limited in that sense. Therefore, when Alice and Bob measure in the computational basis, their measurement results are denoted asm 1m0 , withm 0 ,m 1 ∈ {0, 1}. Similarly, when Bob measures in the Hadamard basis, his measurement result ism −m+ , withm + ,m − ∈ {0, 1}. This limitation leads to the following definition: 00, 01, 10, or 11) . The "count" of this measurement result is the number of distinct qubit-states detected during the measurement.
Definition 8 ("Count" of a Measurement Result). Let us look at a measurement result of Alice or Bob (that is
The above definitions are summarized in Table 1 . 
The Protocol. Notice that Bob does not have a special role in Step 1: he always generates the same state, |+ . For the matter of fact, it is even possible that the adversary Eve generates this state instead of him. 
Protocol 9 ("Classical Alice with a Controllable Mirror").
Robustness Analysis
Notations and Assumptions. We notice that according to the protocol, Alice and Bob assign the following interpretations to all the measurement results (except the results of measurements discarded in Step 5 of the protocol), where "count" has been defined in Definition 8:
-For CTRL states (measured by Bob in the Hadamard basis), only Bob performs a measurement. The interpretations are detailed in Table 3 . -For SIFT-x states (measured by Bob in the computational basis), both Alice and Bob perform measurements and reveal their "counts". The interpretations are detailed in Table 4 . -For SIFT-ALL states, the interpretations are detailed in Tables 5 and 6 . Eve's attack on a state can be performed in both directions: from the source (Bob) to Alice, Eve applies U; from Alice back to Bob, Eve applies V . We may assume that Eve uses a fixed probe space H E for her attacks.
To prove robustness, we will prove that for Eve's attack to be undetectable by Alice and Bob (namely, for Eve's attack not to cause any errors), it must not give Eve any information.
If Alice and Bob cannot detect eavesdropping, the following conditions must be satisfied for all the measurement results that were not discarded in Step 5 of the protocol (otherwise, eavesdropping may be detected): must not be 01. 5. For every SIFT-ALL state, Alice's measurement result must not be 11. 6. For every SIFT-ALL state, Bob's measurement result must not be 01, 10 or 11.
A Lemma Restricting Eve's Actions.
Extending the Fock Space Notations. We remember that the 2-mode Fock space is
where the state |m 1 , m 0 represents m 1 indistinguishable photons in the qubit-state |1 and m 0 indistinguishable photons in the qubit-state |0 . Similarly, Fock space can be represented as
where the state |m − , m + x represents m − indistinguishable photons in the qubit-state |− and m + indistinguishable photons in the qubit-state |+ .
The Lemma. We now prove the following Lemma, that will later be used to restrict Eve's possible attacks: , we get
and since the probability of getting a photon in the qubit-state |− must be 0, it is necessary that |F 1,0 E = |G 0,1 E . , it follows that
From (10) and (11) it follows that
where Proof. We assume that during a run of the protocol, no error can be detected by Alice and Bob; and we prove that Eve gets no information on the raw key. On the way from the source (Bob) to Alice, Eve applies a unitary transformationU on Bob's original state σ |+ B and on an initial probe she attaches. Since Bob's original state is always the same state, Eve always sends the same state, that has the form (including Eve's probe)
where the |E i, j E are non-normalized vectors in H E . In fact, we may assume that Eve generates this state by herself (and blocks the σ |+ B state sent by Bob).
After Alice has attached her probe |0, 0 A , the full state (including Alice's and Eve's probes) is 
with |ψ 
Alice now applies one of the four possible operations (CTRL = I, SIFT-1 = S 1 , SIFT-0 = S 0 , or SIFT-ALL = S) and destructively measures her probe state. The (nonnormalized) state of the Bob+Eve system after Alice's operation (and measurement) is written in Table 7 . 
Now, (19) , (21) and (22) 
Therefore, the state of Eve's probe is independent of all of Alice's and Bob's shared bits, and is always equal to |F E whenever Alice and Bob share a bit. Eve can thus get no information on their shared bits without being detected. ⊓ ⊔
Conclusion
We have presented a new semi-quantum key distribution protocol, and have proved it robust (security analysis is left for the future). Unlike the "QKD with classical Alice" protocol, our new protocol can be experimentally implemented in a secure way, thus avoiding some attacks possible against other SQKD protocols.
